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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
1 V State v. Drawn, Case No. 890253-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24{j; ui the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the State now provides the following supplemental 
authority to support its position regarding sentencing 
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State v. Webb, No. 890256-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 26, 
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Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
1^ l /V£y-{>£vv^ ^ — ^ f [&*ZJ 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN, Case No. 890253-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, 
the case, the facts, and the summary of the argument. Appellant 
responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as follows: 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF 
THE DUE PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT. 
The State invites this Court to abstain from reviewing 
the propriety of the trial court's actions in admitting the in-
court eyewitness identification of Ms. Horn and in admitting the 
hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus through 
the testimony of Officer Edwards, indicating that the admission 
of the confession allegedly given to Officer Edwards by Appellant 
and quoted by Officer Edwards during the trial renders all error 
1 
in this case harmless. This Court should reach the merits of 
these issues because the method of proof used by Officer Edwards 
was unreliable and because the trial court improperly bolstered 
1 Respondent's brief 12-16. 
1 
Officer Edwards1 testimony. 
In State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the 
defendant's confession was recorded in the following manners 
At the suppression hearing, the Provo officer 
testified that when he interviewed defendant 
in Tennessee, he advised defendant of his 
Miranda rights and soon obtained a confession 
from him. Thereafter, the officer apparently 
dictated the confession, stopping after every 
few lines to ask defendant whether what was 
dictated was accurate. The confession was 
then reduced to writing and signed. 
Id. at 891. The court rejected Mr. Carter's claim that the 
admission of the confession violated his rights: 
After reviewing the record, we are 
convinced that there is no proof to support a 
determination that any significant item was 
omitted from the statement, that defendant's 
rights were violated or that he was 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments. In 
fact, defendant's own detailed statements to 
two other witnesses immediately after the 
crime parallel and substantially support the 
confession given to the police. Furthert 
defendant signed the document, and he was not 
denied a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine the officers concerning the accuracy 
of the writing as a reflection of his oral 
confession. 
Id. at 891. 
Before leaving the issue, however, the court was 
careful to note the importance of reliable proof of confessions: 
While we hold that admission of the 
confession was not prejudicial error, we do 
not sanction the particular manner in which 
it was recorded in this case. In Bishop, 
that defendant's confession, together with 
statements made by the police officers, was 
recorded verbatim. This process not only 
helped insure that the defendant's confession 
was not coerced, but also provided both the 
trial court and this court with the correct 
2 
tools fo;r effectively and efficiently 
reviewing the defendant's contentions, as 
well as the totality of the circumstances of 
his confession. Such a process guarantees 
that constitutional rights are protected and 
justice is effected. Nevertheless, while the 
dictation process that occurred in this case 
could conceivably amount, in other instances, 
to deprivation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights, that was not the case 
here. 
Id. at 891. 
The method of proof of the confession in the instant 
case was far less reliable than that utilized and frowned upon in 
Carter. The alleged confession was not recorded, and Officer 
Edwards apparently was not able to find his notes from the 
confession (S.H. 17). While the State is willing to saddle 
Appellant with responsibility for the lack of a recording by 
pointing to Officer Edwards' testimony that Appellant requested 
the tape recorder be turned off, the absence of a recording is 
just as easily explained by Appellant's testimony at the 
suppression hearing that the confession never took place and that 
he never saw or discussed a tape recorder when he was in Officer 
Edwards' presence (S.H. 22-23). 
Despite the unreliable nature of Officer Edwards' 
testimony, the court bolstered it, in telling the jurors to 
accept his quotation of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus as fact: 
Obviously the testimony that he is 
referring to as to that which she said is 
hearsay. Prior to this hearing the court has 
ruled, however, the unavailability of those 
witnesses — there was appropriate effort, 
2 Respondent's brief at 26 n.10. 
3 
the court has found, by the law enforcement 
agencies to locate those witnesses which make 
it possible that the officer may testify and 
you may [ac]cept that as though that witness 
were testifying* 
(T. 150) 
Unfortunately, that was not the only time that the 
court gave special protection to Officer Edwards1 testimony. 
During Appellant's case, his sister, Audrey Robinson was 
testifying concerning a telephone call from Officer Edwards, 
during which he represented himself as calling on behalf of 
defense counsel, James Valdez. The court requested and sustained 
a hearsay objection. 
Q [by Mr. Valdez] Had you told — now, 
did you have a conversation with anybody who 
may have called you as to the vehicle and who 
it belonged to? 
A [by Ms. Robinson] No. Two days ago 
Detective Edwards called and said he was 
calling on your behalf. 
Q On my behalf? 
A Yeah. And he wanted to know — 
Judge Young: Well now, are you just 
going to not object to anything these guys ~ 
say? I mean, this is virtually all hearsay. 
Mr. Verhoef: I will, your Honor. 
Objection; hearsay. 
Judge Young: Sustained. 
(T.2 54). 
During cross-examination of Ms. Robinson, the 
prosecutor was allowed to address a phone conversation between 
Officer Edwards and Audrey Robinson without objection from the 
3 Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay: 
"•Hearsay1 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
4 
court (T.2 56-57). 
In light of the fact that the "confession" upon which 
the State relies to support the conviction was not reliable and 
was improperly bolstered by the court, this Court should not 
conclude that the admission of the confession rendered all other 
errors harmless. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE INFORMED 
OF THE PROPER PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED 
IN CONSIDERING THE ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
During the suppression hearing immediately prior to 
trial, and during the trial the court was informed that there had 
been two line-ups in this case, without identification of 
Appellant (S.H. 3, 32-33; 57). During the trial, Micki Horn was 
allowed, over objection, to testify concerning her recognition of 
Appellant that apparently happened on the morning of the trial 
(T. 57). 
In seeking to justify the trial court's admission of 
Micki Horn's testimony, the State relies on the deferential 
"clear abuse of discretion" standard of review. That deferential 
standard of review is justified by theory that the trial court is 
engaged in the context of the trial and is in the best position 
to evaluate the ruling. As explained in Barber v. Calder, 522 
P.2d 700 (Utah 1974), 
In situations where the exercise of 
discretion is appropriate, considerable 
weight should be given to the determination 
of the trial court, which ever way it goes. 
This is true because due to his close 
involvement with the parties, the witnesses, 
and the total circumstances of the case, he 
5 
is in the best position to judge what the 
interests of justice require in safeguarding 
the rights and interests of all parties 
concerned. 
Id. at 702. 
Appellant asserts that in the unique circumstances of 
this case, the deferential "clear abuse of discretion" standard 
should not apply because the trial court did not have enough 
information to exercise his discretion within the bounds of the 
law when he ruled the identification testimony admissible. The 
proceedings were as followss 
Q Were you in court this morning or see 
Mr. Drawn this morning? 
A Oh yeah, this morning, yes. 
Q And why don't you tell the jurors 
about what you observed then. 
Mr. Valdez: I am going to object at this 
time, your Honor. He's asking for an in-
court identification,. There's already been 
an objective attempt to make an 
identification. That's what a line-up is 
for. Now, obviously, Mr. Drawn is the only 
defendant here. 
Judge Young: Well, your objection has 
been heard and is overruled. If she has any 
independent recollection she can testify to 
it. 
Q [by Mr. Verhoef) Would you please 
explain to the jury what you observed this 
morning? 
A Well, when I walked in I sat down and 
he turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it. 
And everything about him — the features — I 
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't — I 
don't know. But I recognized him. The way 
he moved, the way his back was over, the 
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose, 
everything. 
(T.57-58). 
The admission of this identification testimony came 
6 
prior to the trial court's making the first requisite finding -
that the encounter during which Ms. Horn recognized Appellant 
was not unduly suggestive. See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 
435 (Utah 1989)("First, we must determine whether there was a 
pretrial photographic identification procedure used which was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."). 
While there is no record describing the circumstances 
of the encounter (i.e. was Appellant the only black person in the 
courtroom, who was Micki Horn with when she saw Appellant and 
what did they say to her?), it appears from the transcript of the 
suppression hearing held prior to trial that Appellant was 
4 
shackled. Also, the specificity and detail provided by Ms. 
Horn at trial indicates that her recognition of Appellant was the 
product of suggestion, rather than her independent memory of the 
robbery. 
The trial court did not pause to consider the second 
requisite finding - that the identification was the product of 
Ms. Horn's memory of the robbery. See State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 
432, 435 (Utah 1989)("Second, if the photo array is impermissibly 
suggestive, then the in-court identification must be based on an 
4 See S.H. 8 ("Judge Young: He is certainly going to have 
restraints on during the course of the trial."). 
5 Compare her testimony at trial that she could recognize 
Appellant from the wrinkles on his forehead and his nose (S.H. 
58), to her testimony that during the robbery, her assailant was 
wearing two nylon stockings over his head (T. 52) and her 
testimony indicating she was unable to tell the investigating 
officers the race of her assailant (T. 64). 
7 
untainted, independent foundation to be reliable*")• Review of 
Appellant's discussion of this issue on pages ten through sixteen 
in the opening brief demonstrates that even if the trial court 
had exercised discretion in admitting the identification 
testimony, it would have constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
jurors gravitate to eyewitness identification testimony, 
regardless of cross-examination and cautionary instructions, 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-492 and n. 5 (Utah 1986), this 
Court should recognize the prejudice caused to Appellant by the 
trial court's errors. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND THE HEARSAY RULE 
IN ADMITTING OFFICER EDWARD'S TESTIMONY 
"QUOTING" ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS. 
A. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT AGAINST INTEREST. 
The State maintains that the statements of Rosemary Mar 
and Genora Marcellus could have subjected the witnesses to 
criminal prosecution, and are thus admissible under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3) as statements against interest.' That rule, 
however, does not contemplate that the statement against interest 
be made by one with an attorney's appreciation for possible 
criminal liability. Rather, the rule defines a statement against 
interest with a reasonable person in mind: 
A statement which at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
6 Respondent's brief at 24-25. 
8 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be 
true..•• 
Inasmuch as the statements allegedly made by Rosemary 
Mar and Genora Marcellus are exculpatory, it is reasonable to 
assume that those witnesses intended and expected the statements 
to protect them from, rather than subject them to criminal 
liability. 
The "statement against interest" exception to the 
hearsay rule permits these statements into evidence without the 
reliability test of cross-examination because it the prospect of 
damage to the declarant caused by the statement is considered a 
substitute showing of reliability. See State v. Sanders, 496 
P.2d 270, 273 (1972). Inasmuch as the statements of Rosemary Mar 
and Genora Marcellus are inconsistent descriptions of the same 
event, the reliability that might have been inferred if the 
statements had been inculpatory is destroyed. 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SHOWING OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY. 
In seeking to justify the trial court's admission of 
the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus 
through Officer Edwards, the State points to three exhibits of 
"good faith" efforts to secure the presence of Rosemary Mar and 
Genora Marcellus at trial: the subpoenas sent out, the telephone 
contact with Genora Marcellus1 mother indicating that Genora 
7 See Respondent's brief at 25 n.9., detailing the 
differences between the statements. 
9 
would attend the trial, and the State's inability to locate 
Rosemary Mar. 
The prosecutor in the instant case, who was aware that 
Ms. Marcellus8 mother indicated that Ms. Marcellus would attend 
the trial, did not expect either Ms. Marcellus or Ms. Mar to obey 
the subpoenas. During the suppression hearing, he stated: 
Now, these two ladies were the ones 
referred to by Mr. Drawn this morning during 
his testimony and I have subpoenaed them 
three times to date. All three times they 
have failed to appear. And I haven't checked 
with my witness office as of 10:00 o'clock 
this morning. They should have been there at 
9s15. I suspect they're not going to appear. 
I have sent Detective Edwards out to try and 
track these people down and Detective Edwards 
will testify that he made reasonable efforts 
to track them down but was unable to contact 
them directly, although, a message was left 
with the mother of one. 
(S.H. 34-35). Inasmuch as the State made no efforts to secure 
the witnesses beyond those that the prosecutor didn't expect to 
succeed, characterizing the mailing of the subpoenas and the 
contact with Genora Marcellus' mother as "good faith" efforts to 
secure the attendance of the witnesses falls flat. Cf. State v. 
Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987)(circumstantial evidence 
should have informed the prosecutor that the witness would not 
attend, despite assurances to the contrary); State v. Webb, 113 
Ut.Adv.Rep. 23, 31 (1989)(court acknowledges that it has given a 
strict interpretation to "unavailability precondition."); State 
v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122-1123 (Utah 1982)(prosecution did 
8 Respondent's brief at 20-24. 
10 
not act in good faith, after failing to secure the witness 
through the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from 
Without a State in Criminal Proceeding when the state was on 
notice that the witness was unwilling to appear). 
In discussing the efforts of the ubiquitous Officer 
9 
Edwards" to find Rosemary Mar, the State indicates as follows: 
Edwards was unable to locate Ms. Mar at 
her home address (its location was found 
through use of department informants ), and 
had discovered just the day before trial that 
she had been going by an assumed name. 
Edwards also received information of another 
possible address from Salt Lake County 
Investigator Steve Bartlett, which also came 
up negative when he tried to find Mar (R. 131 
at 40). Testimony at trial showed that Mar 
was possibly living in Indiana, but the 
address was unknown. (R. 130 at 51). 
9 The Officer Edwards on whom the State relied to locate 
and secure the attendance of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus 
appears to be the very same Officer Edwards who quoted the oral 
statements of those witnesses, who quoted Appellant's statement, 
and who called Audrey Robinson on behalf of Defense Counsel, 
James Valdez. 
10 Compare S.H. 40 ("We, through informants in the police 
department and other people, says that's where she's been but we 
have been unable to locate her there."). 
11 Compare S.H. 40 ("And as of last night, well, late 
yesterday afternoon, I found that Ms. Rosemary Mar has been going 
by another name."). There is no information about how Officer 
Edwards came to know about this name, or about what the name was 
(Rose? Mata Hari?). 
12 Compare S.H. 40 ("And he gave me the addresses that he 
knew and we still came up empty-handed."). There was no 
testimony indicating what Officer Edwards did with the addresses 
prior to coming up empty handed. 
13 Officer Edwards was aware that Rosemary Mar was in 
Audrey Robinson's automobile when the robbery occurred (T. 52). 
He knew that Rosemary Mar was Appellant's girlfriend and that 
Audrey was Appellant's sister (T. 159-160; S.H. 38). Although he 
11 
Respondent's brief at 20-21. The State continues in footnote 7 
as follows: 
Taking into consideration that the 
witness could not be located at her home 
address, nor at a second address, and was 
going under an assumed name* and was facing 
possible criminal charges, it would be 
reasonable to assume the witness was 
intentionally evading the law. 
Respondent's brief at 7. 
As demonstrated by footnotes nine through fourteen of 
this brief, reference to the transcripts in this case casts the 
good faith of the state in seeking to locate Ms. Mar in a 
questionable light. 
In short, the State did not meet their burden of 
demonstrating good faith efforts to obtain the presence of 
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus. See pages 21-22 of 
Appellant's opening brief. 
Cc THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT RELIABLE. 
The state relies on the interlocking nature of the 
statements quoted by Officer Edwards in arguing that the hearsay 
statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were reliable. 
was able to contact Ms. Robinson by telephone, he never inquired 
as to the whereabouts of Ms. Mar (T. 52), apparently preferring 
to rely on "informants" and "other people". While Audrey 
Robinson indicated that she did not know an address or a phone 
number where Ms. Mar, who had called her from Indianapolis, could 
be reached (T.2 51, 58), Officer Edwards' failure to inquire 
reflects on the quality of his efforts to locate Ms. Mar. 
14 Despite diligent efforts, Appellant's counsel is unable 
to find a record citation relating to this assertion. 
15 Respondent's brief at 24-26. 
12 
As noted supra, Officer Edwards' method of proof 
(quoting statements that were not recorded, and for which he 
apparently could not find his notes (S.H. 16-17)) was not 
reliable. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989). The 
trial court's improper bolstering and protection of Officer 
Edwards is further evidence that there is good reason not to 
assume that the evidence given from Officer Edwards to the jury 
was reliable. See pages three and four of this brief, supra. 
D. THESE VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION WERE 
NOT HARMLESS ERROR. 
In meeting its burden of proof that these violations of 
Appellant's rights to confrontation were harmless beyond a 
16 
reasonable doubt, it is not enough for the State to argue that 
there is sufficient evidence exclusive of the statements of Ms. 
Mar and Ms. Marcellus to support Appellant's convictions. 
Because the State deprived Appellant of his rights to confront 
those witnesses, the State deprived him of his rights to 
demonstrate their lack of credibility, and to gain exculpatory 
evidence from them. As explained by Justice Marshall, dissenting 
from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986): 
The centrality of cross-examination to 
the factfinding process makes it particularly 
unlikely that an appellate court can 
determine that a denial of cross-
examination had no effect on the outcome of a 
trial. 
11
 [T]he court ordinarily 
cannot measure whether harm has 
16 State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
13 
ensued to an appellant when he has 
been denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses against 
him# given all the risks. Had 
cross-examination been allowed, 
for example, it might have served 
to impeach a witness and thus to 
cast doubt on corroborating 
testimony, or it might have 
elicited exculpatory evidence. 
Only on rare occasions will an 
appellate court be able to find 
that the testimony of the witness 
was so tangential, or so well 
corroborated, or so clearly 
invulnerable to attack that the 
denial of the right to cross-
examination was harmless." R. 
Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless 
Error 68-69 (1970). 
The fact that a particular witness1 testimony 
was corroborated cannot render harmless a 
denial of the right to expose his bias. 
Defense counsel may have valid strategic 
reasons for challenging one witness1 
testimony aggressively while treating a 
corroborating witness more gently. Jurors 
evaluating the witnesses1 demeanor may choose 
to give great weight to the testimony of one 
witness while ignoring the similar testimony 
of another. In either event, denial of 
cross-examination concerning a witness1 bias 
may deprive the defense of its best 
opportunity to expose genuine flaws in the 
prosecution's case - flaws that the cold 
record will not reveal to an appellate court. 
Indeed, an appellate court attempting to 
aPPly harmless-error analysis is faced with a 
formidable burden. The court cannot merely 
satisfy itself that the jury would have 
reached the same result had the witness in 
question not appeared at all; it must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have reached the same result even 
if cross-examination had led the jury 
affirmatively to believe that the witness was 
lying. Moreover, the court must conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that no evidence 
exculpatory to the defendant could have 
emerged from a genuinely adversarial testing 
of the witness. 
14 
Id. at 687-688. 
Thus, this Court is faced with the possibility that 
cross-examination of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus might not only 
have proven them to be dishonest, but also might have provided 
Appellant with further evidence with which to impeach Officer 
Edwards. In these circumstances, the violation of Appellant's 
rights to confrontation cannot be considered harmless error. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED 
AND SENTENCED APPELLANT TWICE FOR THE SAME CRIME. 
The gist of the State's argument in support of 
Appellant's two consecutive sentences (five years to life for the 
armed robbery; five years for the use of a firearm) resulting 
from the use of a gun during the robbery is that Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-3-203 does not define an offense, but merely enhances 
17 
Appellant's sentence for the aggravated robbery. 
Section 76-3-203, however, does define a crime, and 
provides a separate sentence for that crime: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of 
the first degree, for a term at not 
less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by 
law, and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds £ 
firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was 
used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and 
17 Respondent's brief at 33. 
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not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not 
concurrently*.. 
Comparison of the firearm statute with the habitual 
criminal statute and related case law demonstrates that the 
application of the firearm statute in this case violated 
Appellant's rights against double jeopardy. The habitual 
criminal statute is provided in Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001, 
which provides: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
This statute has consistently withstood constitutional 
challenges relating to double jeopardy because it is interpreted 
as an enhancement statute - it does not define a crime for which 
a punishment is imposed. As the court explained in State v. 
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), 
The habitual criminal statute has 
consistently survived constitutional 
challenge. State v. Carter, Utah, 578 P.2d 
1275, 1277 (1978). The statute "does not 
create a new crime; it merely enhances 
punishment" for the latest crime in cases 
where the defendant has been previously 
convicted of and sent to prison for two other 
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felony offenses. JEd. This is consistent 
with the purpose of Utah's statute, which is 
to "make persistent offenders subject to 
greater sanctions." State v. Montague, Utah, 
671 P.2d 187, 190 (198TT Further, the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
"repeatedly has held that increased penalties 
for recidivists do not represent punishment 
for earlier crimes and therefore do not 
violate the prohibitions against double 
jeopardy. Rather, the fact of the earlier 
crimes aggravates the commission of the 
latest crime, warranting the imposition of a 
longer sentence." Note, The 
Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting 
increased Sentences for habitual or Dangerous 
Criminals, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 356, 361 n. 29 
(1975)(citations omitted). 
Id. at 286-287. 
Consistent with this enhancement theory, there is no 
separate sentence imposed for the habitual criminal conviction. 
As the court explained in State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 
1989), 
This Court has consistently held that "the 
[habitual criminal ] statute 'does not create 
a new crime; it merely enhances punishment1 
for the latest crime." Since no crime 
exists, there can be no sentence. Assigning 
a separate sentence for recidivism does more 
than enhance punishment for the latest crime, 
it penalizes an individual for past 
convictions. 
Id. at 145. 
Inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 provides 
explicitly for a separate, consecutive sentence for an actus 
reus (use of a firearm) for which Appellant was already convicted 
and sentenced (use of a firearm during the commission of the 
robbery), the trial court's application of the firearm 
"enhancement" statute in this case violated Appellant's rights 
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against double jeopardy. See Appellant's opening brief at pages 
thirty-three to forty-two. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction rests on unreliable evidence 
from two witnesses - Micki Horn, who was improperly allowed to 
identify Appellant in court after a presumably suggestive pre-
trial show up and without independent recollection of her 
assailant stemming from the robbery; and Officer Edwards, who was 
able to establish the need for his own testimony by demonstrating 
the unavailability of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus, and then deliver 
his testimony to the jurors, not only unimpeached, but with the 
imprimatur of the trial court. 
Because the firearm "enhancement" statute imposes a 
separate sentence for the crime of using a firearm, the trial 
court violated Appellant's rights against Double Jeopardy by 
applying that "enhancement" statute to this case, in which 
Appellant was already convicted and sentenced for use of a 
firearm during the robbery. 
Just as clearly as the actions of the trial court 
violated Appellant's rights to due process and confrontation, and 
against double jeopardy, the actions of the trial court 
prejudiced Appellant's case. Appellant's convictions and 
sentences must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
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% day of Jt(Ltfrvb&L--< 
Attcrcrney for Defendant/Appellant 
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STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-203 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of 
the first degree, for a term at not 
less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by 
law, and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was 
used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently... 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of 
the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as 
a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), 
A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
